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In the last years the number of malware Apps that the users download to their devices has risen. In this paper, we propose an agent-
based model to quantify the Android malware infection evolution, modeling the behavior of the users and the different markets
where the users may download Apps. The model predicts the number of infected smartphones depending on the type of malware.
Additionally, we will estimate the cost that the users should afford when the malware is in their devices. We will be able to analyze
which part is more critical: the users, giving indiscriminate permissions to the Apps or not protecting their devices with antivirus
software, or the Android platform, due to the vulnerabilities of the Android devices that permit their rooted. We focus on the
community of Valencia, Spain, although the obtained results can be extrapolated to other places where the number of Android
smartphones remains fairly stable.
1. Introduction
The security in devices connected to the Internet is an
issue that has long been concerned, from governments and
companies to individual users.However, this threat seems not
being perceived by the smartphone users taking into account
the potential risky behavior of them and the sensitive data
and pictures the users store in their devices. Moreover, the
risk increases with the new companies policies that permit
the employees the use of their own smartphones in the work
accessing to company sensitive data and applications (bring
your own device BYOD).
Different types of malware have already been docu-
mented [1, 2] and it may be a threat that must be studied
to quantify the users’ potential risk. Here, we will focus
on Android platform because most of the smartphones use
Android OS [3].
During the year 2011 appeared the first study on the
characterization of viruses on mobile OS Android [1, 2]. This
study categorizes the types and families of viruses found,
depending on the type of installation, activation, effects on
the infected device, the user management of the permissions,
and so forth, showing the diversity of different virus families
and the ineffectiveness of the traditional antivirus methods
on mobile devices.
Also, there are several works that have approached the
analysis and detection of malware on the Android platform
[4–6]. The common objective of these works is to propose
new methods of virus detection on mobile devices from a
dynamic point of view, that is, to detect at runtime anomalous
or unwanted behavior of the device (system calls, network
access, and memory or file modifications). In contrast, static
and classic antivirus methods are based on repositories of
previously known viruses that do not protect the user in
case of the spread of an unknown new virus type. How-
ever, dynamic detection of viruses is unsuitable for mobile
devices for their CPU and memory consumption. The two
approaches, static and dynamic methods, have their own
advantages and disadvantages, and bothmay be bypassed and
unable to avoid the spread of new viruses.
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1.1. State of the Art. In the literature, there are several
approaches to the mathematical modeling for the spread
of viruses on mobile devices. In [7] the authors describe a
framework and the main guidelines to design reliable agent-
basedmalwaremodels considering infections via SMS/MMS,
Bluetooth RF, IM, P2P, and email. In [8–10] the authors pro-
pose approaches based onmathematical epidemic techniques
where the malware infection follows similar dynamics to the
infectious diseases.
Also, there are models based on the physical architecture
of the mobile and wireless networks [12] or based on the
mobility of the users, but they do not consider the intercon-
nectivity based on the exchange of applications [9].
To the best of our knowledge, we do not know any paper
showing quantification, prediction and/or simulation about
how the users installmalwareApps.However, literature about
the application of machine learning techniques to detect
malware Apps in the markets can be found [6]. Nevertheless,
any of the above approaches do not take into account the
infection model based on an App-market ecosystem, like
smartphones environment does.
1.2. Our Proposal. Likely, the model guidelines suggested
in [7] are the most suited to the current scenario. In that
contribution, an agent-based model of malware dynamics
covering all of the possible infection models except the App-
market ecosystem model is proposed. The integration of the
App-market ecosystem is the key aspect that we will consider
in this paper.
As we indicated previously, researchers and compa-
nies characterized mobile malware and proposed alternative
methods to prevent, detect, and avoid mobile malware. Also,
different companies publish periodically mobile malware
reports with estimations and statistics. However, in the liter-
ature there is a lack of studies that quantify the effects of the
malware infection in the Android platform in order to show
realistic data to know the extent of the threat as our model
does [13]. Our model (App-Model) complements the agent-
based malware modeling suggested in [7] introducing a new
infection process based on applications downloaded from the
App-market. In Figure 1 we can see a rough description of the
items which we deal with to build the App-Model.
TheApp-Model will quantify the Androidmalware infec-
tion evolution (to know the real threat for the users), the
number of potential infected smartphones (to estimate the
population of smartphones affected by malware), and the
type of malware that affects these infected smartphones in
the community of Valencia, Spain [14]. The results can be
exported to other regions where the number of Android
smartphone users is fairly stable.
Wemust say that other approaches asmachine learning or
data mining techniques could be used to study the evolution
of the malware infection; however these techniques do not
take into account the behavior of the actors (markets, Apps,
and clients). The knowledge of their behavior and how they
interact allows simulating new scenarios where the behavior
may be different and predicting the evolution of the malware
infection considering these changes.
Number of total Apps over the time
Number of Apps per popularity
Number of Apps malware over the time
Number of Apps malware per popularity
Malware detection
Official market
Nonofficial
market
Users
Apps downloaded per month
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OS version?
Does the downloaded malware affect?
Smartphone renewal
Figure 1: General structure of the agent-based model. Issues we are
going to take into account in the modelling process.
Additionally, note that with the results of the model we
will be able to analyse the critical part of the smartphones
business model related to malware; that is, we will find out
which part is more critical: the users, giving indiscriminate
permissions to the Apps or not protecting their devices with
mobile antivirus software, or the Android platform, due to
the vulnerabilities of the Android devices that permit their
rooted. Furthermore, we will be able to estimate the cost that
the users should afford in case that they have in their devices
malware that causes financial charges.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present
the agents of the model: Apps, markets, users, habits, and so
forth. In Section 3 we describe how the agent-based model
evolves over the time. Section 4 is devoted to carry out
simulations, present results, and discuss them. Conclusions
are drawn in Section 5.
2. Material and Methods
To conduct our study, we set the time period in a month.The
starting time-point (𝑡 = 0) is Jul 2011. This has been chosen
because in Jul 2011 none or only very few smartphones could
have been infected.
The agent-based approach allows the analysis of service
interactions among the agents and fits perfectly the relation
between mobile device users and App-markets.
Then, in this model, two domains including their agents
will be considered: themarkets, where the agents are theApps
that belong to different markets, and the users, where the
agents are the mobile devices (or clients) that belong to every
user.The study of the behavior of the agents has been studied
in reference [15].
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The App has the attributesmalware and type that indicate
whether an App is malware and its type, respectively. Given
that the effect over the client produced by a malware App
can be one or more of the malicious payload described, we
consider that if amalwareApp carriesmore than one payload,
the type of the malware App belongs to the most upper level
payload, according to financial charge, privilege escalation,
remote control, and information collection [15].
Whether the client is infected or not, the OS version,
if the device has or not software protection, and the kind
of infection are the attributes of the client. The privilege
escalation malware affects the client depending on the OS
version [15].
Additionally, we consider that clients download a certain
number of Apps every month, determined by download
method, select the downloaded App by the method selection,
and determine if the downloadedApp infects the client or not
with the infection method. More details related to download
process are the following.
(i) Downloadmethod: we admit that the number of Apps
downloaded by a user in a month follows a Poisson
distribution:
𝑓 (𝑘, 𝜆) =
𝑒
−𝜆
𝜆
𝑘
𝑘!
, 𝑘 = 0, 1, 2, . . . , (1)
where 𝑘 is the number of downloaded Apps and 𝜆 >
0 is the average number of Apps downloaded every
month in every smartphone.
(ii) Selection method: knowing 𝑘 from download method,
this method selects randomly 𝑘 Apps from the mar-
kets. The selection will depend on the popularity and
the number of downloads.
(iii) Infection method: with the 𝑘 selected Apps, we take
the ones that are malware, and this method deter-
mines if the App affects the client or not, depending
on the App attributes (malware and type) and the
Client attributes (OS version and antivirus).
Now, we are going to summarize, until the end of this
section, the main results given in [15] that we will use
throughout this paper.
2.1. Official Market. Let us describe the main features of the
official market also known as Google Play [16].
(i) Considering that the data of the new Apps entering
everymonth in the officialmarket show a linear trend,
it can be modeled, in the mean square sense, by the
function
𝑓OM (𝑡) = 225 970 + 20 740.1𝑡, 𝑡 = 0, 1, 2, . . . , (2)
where 𝑡 is the number of months since July 2011. More
details are in [15].
(ii) Analogously, the number of malware Apps in the
official market is modeled by the function
𝑓OM𝑚 (𝑡) = 64.9 + 35.9𝑡, 𝑡 = 0, 1, 2, . . . , (3)
where 𝑡 is the number of months since July 2011
which corresponds to 𝑡 = 0. More details are in [15].
(iii) Distribution of Apps according to their popularity:
Apps are classified according to their popularity. The
initial distribution of the 221 875 Apps in July 2011 is
given in Table 1.
(iv) Distribution of malware Apps according to their
popularity: the malware Apps initially distributed by
popularity (July 2011) can be seen in Table 2. Repack-
aging [2], that is, take a popular App, introduce some
malware code, and upload it again to the market, is
considered.
(v) Malware detection: the admitted effectiveness of the
App scanning service of Android market is around
40% [15].
(vi) Distribution of malware Apps according to their type:
the distribution ofmalwareApps in the officialmarket
according to [2] is shown in Table 3.
2.2. Nonofficial Market. Let us describe the markets other
than Google Play [17].
(i) Considering that the data of the new Apps entering
every month in the nonofficial market also show a
linear trend, it can be modeled, in the mean square
sense, by the function
𝑓NOM (𝑡) = 1.65𝑓OM (𝑡) , 𝑡 = 0, 1, 2, . . . , (4)
where 𝑡 is the number ofmonths since July 2011 which
corresponds to 𝑡 = 0. Details can be found in [15].
(ii) Similarly, the new malware Apps entering every
month in the nonofficialmarket are given by the func-
tion
𝑓NOM𝑚 (𝑡) = 529.9 + 225.9𝑡, 𝑡 = 0, 1, 2, . . . , (5)
describing the evolution of Apps in the nonofficial
market, where 𝑡 is the number of months since July
2011 which corresponds to 𝑡 = 0.
(iii) Distribution ofApps according to their popularity: we
classify the Apps depending on their popularity in the
nonofficial market as it is shown in Table 4.
(iv) Distribution of malware Apps according to their
popularity: we classify the Apps depending on their
popularity in the nonofficial market as it is shown in
Table 5.
(v) Malware detection: there is not antivirus service in the
nonofficial market.
(vi) Distribution of malware Apps according to their type:
the distribution of malware Apps, according to [2],
in the nonofficial market by their type is shown in
Table 6.
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Table 1: Initial distribution of Apps by popularity in July 2011.
Popularity None 2.5 2.5–3.0 3.0–3.5 3.5–4.0 4.0–4.5 >4.5
Number of Apps 114 789 5 985 6 053 13 512 21 599 31 493 28 444
%Apps 51.74% 2.70% 2.73% 6.09% 9.73% 14.19% 12.82%
Table 2: Initial distribution of malware Apps by popularity in July 2011 taking into account repackaging.
Popularity None 2.5 2.5–3.0 3.0–3.5 3.5–4.0 4.0–4.5 >4.5
Number of Apps 9 0 0 1 2 39 35
Table 3: Distribution ofmalware Apps in the official market accord-
ing to their type.
Type % Type %
Financial charge 14.22% Remote control 43.49%
Privilege escalation 14.22% Information collection 28.07%
2.3. Users. Let us describe the main features regarding the
users behavior.
(i) Number of users: in the community of Valencia there
were 1 176 954 Android smartphones. We are going to
consider this value constant over the time.
(ii) Smartphone renewal: a user changes his/her smart-
phone every 11.5 months, in average [18].
(iii) Users with antivirus installed in their devices: we
assume that the number of users with antivirus
installed in their devices is 33% [19]. However, this
figure is under discussion; therefore, we will simulate
taking values in [0, 0.66], the maximum unbiased
likely interval.Moreover, the admitted effectiveness of
these antivirus software is between 20.2% and 79.6%
[2].
(iv) Average number of Apps downloaded: every user
downloads an average of 6.2 Apps per month [15].
(v) OS version evolution and infection by privilege esca-
lation malware: the evolution of the OS versions
installed on the smartphones is shown in Table 7.
Table 8 shows the percentage of devices that can
be affected by the most common Android privilege
escalation vulnerabilities [20].
(vi) App downloads by popularity: let us define 𝑐
1
, 𝑐
2
, 𝑐
3
,
and 𝑐
4
with 0 ≤ 𝑐
1
< 𝑐
2
< 𝑐
3
< 𝑐
4
, the average
number of downloads of Apps in the community
of Valencia with less than 500 downloads, between
500 and 5000 downloads, between 5000 and 50000
downloads, and more than 50000 downloads all over
the world, respectively. Denoting by 𝑑
1
, 𝑑
2
, 𝑑
3
, and 𝑑
4
the probabilities a user in the community of Valencia
downloads an App which number of downloads in
all the world are less than 500, between 500 and
5000, between 5000 and 50000 or more than 50000
downloads, respectively, then
𝑑
𝑖
=
𝑐
𝑖
𝐶
, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4, (6)
where 𝐶 = 𝑐
1
+ 𝑐
2
+ 𝑐
3
+ 𝑐
4
and 𝑐
𝑖
, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4, should
satisfy that
𝑐
1
= 26.4885 − 0.439884𝑐
2
− 0.24981𝑐
3
− 0.0978913𝑐
4
, (7)
where
0 ≤ 𝑐
1
< 𝑐
2
< 𝑐
3
< 𝑐
4
< 270.59. (8)
More details are in [15].
(vii) When can a user be infected by a malware App? A
downloaded malware App infects the client if one of
the following conditions are met.
(a) The downloaded malware App is of the type
privilege escalation, the OS is vulnerable, and
there is not any installed antivirus.
(b) The downloaded malware App is of the type
remote control, financial charge, or informa-
tion collection and there is not any installed
antivirus.
(c) The downloaded malware App is of the type
privilege escalation, the OS is vulnerable, and
the installed antivirus does not detect the mal-
ware (the antivirus is not effective).
(d) The downloaded malware App is of the type
remote control, financial charge, or information
collection and the installed antivirus does not
detect the malware (the antivirus is not effec-
tive).
(viii) Probability that a user detects that his/her smart-
phone is infected and fixes it: we also mentioned that
the average replacement cycle of smartphones is 11.5
months [18]. Anyway, the user detects and repairs
infections caused by financial charge malware when
he/she receives the mobile bill.
3. The App-Model Evolution Rules
The users and the markets have their own rules that define
the initialization point and the evolution for the agents sets.
The evolution rules for the client agents simulate the behavior
of the users, establishing how many Apps are downloaded
monthly by a client, how the App selection method by the
client based on theApp’s popularity is, if the downloadedApp
infects the device, and how long a user changes his/her device.
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Table 4: Initial distribution of Apps by popularity in July 2011 in the nonofficial market.The percentages are the same as in the official market,
Table 1.
Popularity None 2.5 2.5–3.0 3.0–3.5 3.5–4.0 4.0–4.5 >4.5
Number of Apps 189 894 9 900 10 014 22 353 35 730 52 098 47 055
%Apps 51.74% 2.70% 2.73% 6.09% 9.73% 14.19% 12.82%
Table 5: Initial distribution of malware Apps by popularity in July 2011 in the nonofficial market. Repackaging is also considered.
Popularity None 2.5 2.5–3.0 3.0–3.5 3.5–4.0 4.0–4.5 >4.5
Number of Apps 48 3 3 6 9 219 198
Table 6: Distribution of malware Apps in the nonofficial market
according to their type.
Type % Type %
Financial charge 50.10% Remote control 10.06%
Privilege escalation 35.58% Information collection 4.26%
The evolution rules for the App-markets establish the
number of new Apps in every market each month, how the
markets control the new submitted Apps (Google Play uses
Bouncer which scans submitted Apps looking for malware),
how the markets distributes the Apps by popularity, and so
forth.
Then, using the considerations introduced so far, we are
going to describe the evolution rules of the model. Recall that
the time period is amonth and the starting point of themodel
𝑡 = 0 corresponds to July 2011.
First, we sample percentages 𝑑
1
, 𝑑
2
, 𝑑
3
, and 𝑑
4
as
described in (6), (7), and (8). Then for every month 𝑡.
(i) State the official market:
(a) determine the number of Apps in this market in
month 𝑡 according to (2);
(b) distribute them according to their popularity
following the percentage values in Table 1;
(c) determine the number of malware Apps in this
market in month 𝑡 according to (3);
(d) distribute them according to their popularity
following the percentage values in Table 2;
(e) malware detection: 40% of malware is detected
and removed.
(ii) State the nonofficial market:
(a) determine the number of Apps in this market in
month 𝑡 according to (4);
(b) distribute them according to their popularity
following the percentage values in Table 4;
(c) determine the number of malware Apps in this
market in month 𝑡 according to (5);
(d) distribute them according their popularity fol-
lowing the percentage values in Table 5.
(iii) User behavior. For every user:
(a) Download method: take a random value 𝑢
between 0 and 1 and obtain the maximum value
of 𝑘 such that ∑𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑓(𝑗, 𝜆) ≤ 𝑢 (see expression
(1)).
(b) Selection method: select 𝑘 Apps from each
market with a probability of 50%, in such a way
that their popularity is rated according to the
probabilities 𝑑
1
, 𝑑
2
, 𝑑
3
, and 𝑑
4
, and malware
or not with probability 𝑓OM𝑚(𝑡)/𝑓OM(𝑡) for the
official market and 𝑓NOM𝑚(𝑡)/𝑓NOM(𝑡) for the
nonofficial market.
(c) Infection method: if any of the downloaded
Apps are malware, for each malware App, one
has the following.
(1) If it has been downloaded from the official
market, determine its type with probabil-
ities given in Table 3. Then, it infects the
smartphone depending on the OS installed
(Table 7) if there is antivirus and its effec-
tiveness.
(2) If it has been downloaded from the nonof-
ficial market, determine its type with prob-
abilities given in Table 6.Then, it infects the
smartphone depending on the OS installed
(Table 7) if there is antivirus and its effec-
tiveness.
(d) Check if the user detects if the smartphone is infected
and fix it only in case the malware is financial charge
and the repair is done at the end of the month.
(e) Check if the user changes his/her smartphone (every
11.5 months in average).
The algorithmic evolution of the App-Model described
above is drawn as the flowchart shown in Figure 2. The left
side of the figure represents the evolution of the clients and
the right side the evolution of the Apps that evolve in parallel.
The start point represents the initial month of the model
(𝑡 = 0), where the model creates the clients and sets their
attributes. After this, and for every step (𝑡 = 𝑖), the model
begins its evolution and all of the clients (left side of the
figure) run their methods in the showed order and change,
if needed, their attributes. Also, for every step (𝑡 = 𝑖),
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Table 7: Distribution of OS versions in Android smartphones from July 2011 until February 2013 [11].
Version Affected July 2011 October 2011 February 2012 June 2012 October 2012 February 2013
1.5 Cupcake 1.40% 0.90% 0.40% 0.20% 0.10% 0.00%
1.6 Donut 2.20% 1.40% 0.80% 0.50% 0.30% 0.20%
2.1 Eclair 17.50% 10.70% 6.60% 4.70% 3.10% 1.90%
2.2 Froyo 59.40% 40.70% 25.30% 17.30% 12.00% 7.50%
2.3 Gingerbread 18.60% 44.40% 62.00% 64.00% 54.20% 44.10%
3.0 Honeycomb 0.90% 1.90% 3.30% 2.40% 1.80% 1.20%
4.0 Ice-cream 0.00% 0.00% 1.60% 10.90% 25.80% 28.60%
4.1 Jelly 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.70% 16.50%
Table 8: Percentage of devices that can be affected by the most common privilege escalation vulnerabilities, depending on the Android OS
version.
Version Name Affected Version Name Affected
1.5 Cupcake 100% 2.3 Gingerbread 100%
1.6 Donut 100% 3.0 Honeycomb 0.00%
2.1 Eclair 96.70% 4.0 Ice-cream 31.00%
2.2 Froyo 98.80% 4.1 Jelly 0.00%
the model establishes the markets that are changing every
month, sets the Apps attributes, and groups them depending
on the number of downloads (right side of the figure). After
this, and for every step, the number of Apps of the markets is
recalculated according their evolution curve. All this process
runs in parallel, but on every step the selection method of the
clients can be executed only after the Apps are grouped. After
the last step of evolution of the model (𝑡 = 𝑇), the end point
of the simulation is reached.
4. Results and Discussion
Once the model has been built and the evolution rules
are stated, there are some model parameters unknown but
satisfying some restrictions:
(i) Apps download percentages per popularity 𝑑
1
, 𝑑
2
, 𝑑
3
,
𝑑
4
, and 𝑑
5
, satisfying (6), (7) and (8),
(ii) the percentage of smartphones with antivirus,
denoted by 𝐴, is in [0, 0.66] [19], and
(iii) the effectiveness of the antivirus protection, denoted
by 𝐸, is in [0.202, 0.796] [2].
Now, in first place, we are going to see if the model output
depends on the number of smartphone users. If it is, we will
have to simulate the behavior of 1 176 954 users. Otherwise,
we will be able to reduce the number of users in order to run
the simulation very much quicker.
Secondly, we will simulate a large amount of runs in order
to estimate the number of the monthly infections by malware
Apps.
4.1. Model Evolution Depending on the Number of Users. In
this first experiment, we take fixed values of 𝑑
1
, 𝑑
2
, 𝑑
3
, 𝑑
4
, 𝑑
5
,
𝐴, and 𝐸 and we run simulations for 1000, 5000, 7000, 10000,
15000, 20000, 30000, 40000, 50000, 65000, 80000, 100000,
120000, and 150000 users during 𝑡 = 1, . . . , 15 months.
Then, in Table 9 we can see the comparison of percentage
of cumulative (aggregated) and residual (new ones) infected
users for month 𝑡 = 15. Few differences can be noted.
Therefore, we do not need to simulate the 1 176 954 Android
smartphones in the community of Valencia to obtain reliable
and accurate results. After some tests, we decided to consider
50000 users.
4.2. Estimations. Thus, in order to compute reliable esti-
mations based on 95% confidence intervals (CI 95%), we
use the technique called latin hypercube sampling (LHS)
[21] to select sets of parameters to be substituted into the
model. Latin hypercube sampling (a type of stratified Monte
Carlo sampling) is an efficientmethod for achieving equitable
samples of all input parameters simultaneously.Moreover, the
random selection of the sets of parameters done by LHS will
allow us to study the model sensitivity by the CI 95%.
In our case, taking 50000 smartphone users, starting in
July 2011 and finishing in December 2014 (𝑡 = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 41
months), and following the evolution rules, LHS was used to
generate 100000 different values of each input parameter 𝑑
1
,
𝑑
2
, 𝑑
3
, 𝑑
4
, 𝑑
5
, 𝐴, and 𝐸 sampled as follows.
(1) Sample values 0 ≤ 𝑐
1
< 𝑐
2
< 𝑐
3
< 𝑐
4
< 270.59 such that
𝑐
1
= 26.4885 − 0.439884𝑐
2
− 0.24981𝑐
3
− 0.0978913𝑐
4
,
and calculate 𝑑
𝑖
= 𝑐
𝑖
/𝐶, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4.
(2) Sample a value of𝐴 uniformly in the interval [0, 0.66].
(3) Sample a value of 𝐸 uniformly in the interval
[0.202, 0.796].
We used these samples to run 100000 evaluations of
the model obtaining 100000 model outputs (infected smart-
phones) for each month 𝑡 = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 41. Then, for each
month we take the 100000 model outputs and calculate
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For all clients every step
Download method
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Figure 2: App-Model flowchart. In this figure we describe the evolution process of the model from 𝑡 = 0 (start point) to 𝑡 = 𝑇 (end point),
showing, for every time instant, the creation of the agents, the assignation of attributes, the order of performance of the methods, and their
interaction.
Table 9: Comparison of percentage of cumulative and residual
infected users for month 𝑡 = 15. The results are very similar.
Number of
users % of accumulated infected % of residual infected
1000 5.10% 0.70%
5000 5.52% 0.68%
7000 5.29% 0.59%
10000 5.23% 0.63%
15000 4.77% 0.53%
20000 4.95% 0.48%
30000 4.88% 0.51%
40000 5.19% 0.52%
50000 5.13% 0.55%
65000 5.12% 0.53%
80000 5.06% 0.55%
100000 5.15% 0.56%
120000 4.89% 0.56%
150000 5.01% 0.55%
the mean and the 95% confidence intervals taking into
account the empirical 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles.
In Figure 3 we can see the evolution of the cumulative
infections since July 2011 until December 2014 with a 95%
confidence interval. In Table 10 we can see the numerical
values of the mean and CI 95% of the cumulative infections
in the community of Valencia in July 2013, July 2014, and
December 2014.
In Figure 4 we can see the evolution of the new (residual)
infected smartphones every month with a 95% confidence
interval since July 2011 until December 2014. It can be seen
that since October 2012, there is a certain stabilization in the
number of new infected smartphones. In Table 11 we can see
the numerical values of the mean and CI 95% of the residual
Table 10: Mean and CI 95% of the accumulated infected smart-
phones in July 2013, July 2014, andDecember 2014 in the community
of Valencia and the corresponding percentages predicted by the
model.
Mean CI 95%
July 86163 [57388, 110540]
2013 7.32% [4.88%, 9.39%]
July 139623 [93191, 178450]
2014 11.86% [7.92%, 15.16%]
December 162788 [108680, 207756]
2014 13.83% [9.23%, 17.65%]
Table 11: Mean and CI 95% of the residual infected smartphones
in July 2013, July 2014, and December 2014 in the community of
Valencia and the corresponding percentages predicted by themodel.
Mean CI 95%
July 3818 [2448, 5108]
2013 0.32% [0.21%, 0.43%]
July 4037 [2613, 5367]
2014 0.34% [0.22%, 0.46%]
December 4105 [2660, 5461]
2014 0.35% [0.23%, 0.46%]
infections in the community of Valencia in July 2013, July
2014, and December 2014.
Finally, in Figure 5, we show the mean and the 95%
confidence interval of cumulative infected smartphones by
privilege escalation (PE) and financial charge (FC) malware.
Comparing Figure 5 to Figure 3 we can see that financial
charge malware infects a half of the smartphones according
to [2, 22]. In Table 12 we can see the numerical values of
the mean and CI 95% of the cumulative infections in the
community of Valencia in July 2013, July 2014, and December
2014.
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Table 12: Mean and CI 95% of the accumulated infected smartphones by privilege escalation and financial charge in July 2013, July 2014, and
December 2014 in the community of Valencia and the corresponding percentages predicted by the model. These figures can give us an idea
about the amount of money that the financial charge malware moves every month.
Privilege escalation Financial charge
Mean CI 95% Mean CI 95%
July 24857 [16360, 32743] 39824 [26340, 51857]
2013 2.11% [1.39%, 2.78%] 3.38% [2.24%, 4.41%]
July 38481 [25493, 50185] 66861 [44418, 86341]
2014 3.27% [2.17%, 4.26%] 5.68% [3.77%, 7.34%]
December 44414 [29447, 57718] 78643 [52304, 101289]
2014 3.77% [2.50%, 4.90%] 6.68% [4.44%, 8.61%]
Jul/11 Jan/12 Jul/12 Jan/13 Jul/13 Jan/14 Jul/14 Dec/14
0
1
2
3
4
5
Percentage of accumulated infected smartphones
Percentile 97.5
Mean
Percentile 2.5
Figure 3: Model evolution of the cumulative smartphone infections
every month since July 2011 until December 2014. The line in the
middle is the mean and those up and down correspond to 95%
confidence interval.
4.3. Model Validation. In [13], Patterson talks about Google’s
Android security chief Adrian Ludwig who gave a talk at
the Virus Bulletin conference in Berlin. In this talk, Ludwig
said that the problem Google wants to solve is that most
of independent security researchers do not have access to
a platform such as Google to measure how many times a
malware App has been installed. Also, he mentioned that
security researchers are very good at finding and fixing
malware, but in the absence of reliable data that indicate how
frequently a malware App has been installed the threat level
can become exaggerated. Reports that reach publication are
often extremely exaggerated. To emphasize this point, Ludwig
revealed in his analysis that some of the most publicized
recent malware discoveries are installed in less than one per
million installations. Additionally, he reported that based
on the data from tracking over one and a half billion App
installs Google obtained convincing evidence that the rate of
potentially harmful Apps installed is stable at about 1 200 per
million App installs or about 0.12%.
Furthermore, the official reports as F-Secure Report
(mobile threat report September 2013), Trend Micro Report
Jul/11 Jan/12 Jul/12 Jan/13 Jul/13 Jan/14 Jul/14 Dec/14
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Percentage of residual infected smartphones
Percentile 97.5
Mean
Percentile 2.5
Figure 4: Evolution of new smartphone infections every month
since July 2011 until December 2014. The line in the middle is
the mean and those up and down correspond to 95% confidence
interval. Nowadays, there is a stabilization in the number of new
infected smartphones.
(Trend Labs Security report 3Q 2013), or Secure List Report
(mobile malware evolution February 2014) do not only show
the number of devices affected by installed malware Apps but
also show the number of Apps detected as malware.
As a consequence, comparing the figures given by the
proposed model to the real ones is not going to be an easy
task because of lack of real data. In fact, to our knowledge,
the only data about potentially harmful Apps installed are the
one mentioned above: stable and about 0.12%.
Then, taking into account that the conference was held
on October 3rd, 2013 [13], we may compare this data with
prediction of the model for new smartphone infections
in September 2013: stable and mean 0.33% with CI 95%
[0.21%,0.44%].
Hence, our model predicts a stable situation of harmful
Apps installed, as Google says, and a little bit higher number
of infected smartphones than Google. This slight difference
may be due to the development of the techniques for detect-
ing malware during the period of time considered in our
simulation, resulting in increased effectiveness of antivirus
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Figure 5: Evolution of the cumulative smartphone infections due to privilege escalation (PE) on the left and financial charge (FC) on the
right, malware every month since July 2011 until December 2014. The line in the middle is the mean and those up and down correspond to
the 95% confidence interval.
software than that used in the initial parameters of our
simulation in terms of the effectiveness of antivirus software
and therefore reducing the number of malware installed in
the Google analysis. Taking into account this regard, we
consider that our model provides valid results in terms of
estimation of number of infected smartphones and in terms
of stable evolution of the infections.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we present an agent-basedmodel to quantify the
Android malware infection evolution. Some model outputs
are compared to data given byGoogle and the results are fairly
similar, stable, and a little bit higher for themodel predictions.
Considering the parameters of our model and our simu-
lations, the obtained results show that, given a specific popu-
lation of devices with Android OS, one has the following.
(i) Ameanof 0.3%of devices are infected everymonth by
somekind ofmalware.This number is stable over time
fromOctober 2012 onwards, considering the growing
curve for the total Apps and malware Apps.
(ii) Taking into account cumulative values from July 2011
to December 2014, we predict that the infections will
be around a mean of 13.83% over the total number of
devices considered.
(iii) From this 13.83%, around the half of the total (48%)
will be infections by financial charge malware type,
and around a third (27%) will be infections by priv-
ilege escalation malware type. The remainder (25%)
will be infections by remote control and information
collection malware type.
(iv) Thus, the infections by financial charge, remote con-
trol, and information collection malware type are
due to the users because they give indiscriminate
permissions to the Apps and do not protect properly
their mobile with antivirus software. Therefore, we
show that two-thirds of the infections are caused
by these two factors, showing that the most critical
part for the malware infections at smartphones is the
users habits and the ineffectiveness of the traditional
antivirus software, not due to the OS vulnerabilities.
(v) Quantifying andmonetizing the financial chargemal-
ware incidence: we can consider that, from the 0.3%
new infected devices during a month, the half part is
infected by financial charge and that every infection
causes a monthly overrun of 30 euros (we have
some examples of mobile bills such that their owners
suffered an infection of financial charge malware and
the amount of these bills are around 30 euros) in
every device. Considering that the total population
of Android devices in Spain is 10 853 813, the number
of infected devices by financial charge malware type
during a month is 16 280 (i.e. 0.15%) and the financial
charge caused by this kind ofmalware during amonth
will be 488 400 euros.
With our model, we show realistic data that can be
considered in order to quantify the real threat for the users
and the number of potential infected smartphones. With
these results, we consider that preventive strategies against
mobilemalware should be developedmainly focusing on new
malware detection approaches before being downloaded by
the users, because, as we shown, the users decisions and the
ineffectiveness of the traditional antivirus software approach
are the critical part for the infections.
Moreover, with the presented model, despite the increas-
ing of Apps, we could see that the number of new infected
smartphones achieved stable figures, and then it is not
expected a significant change in the current stable trend.
One of the most interesting features of the presented
model is that if some of the parameters vary because of chan-
ges in the behavior of the actors (markets, Apps, and clients)
we only have to tune the corresponding model parameters
and perform the simulations to predict the evolution of the
infected smartphones for the new scenario.
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Finally, we want to point out that this model and simula-
tions can be extrapolated to other regions where the number
of Android smartphones is fairly stable over the time.
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